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‘‘The trial is central to the institutional framework of criminal
justice.’’ With this very ﬁrst sentence of the ﬁrst volume of The Trial on
Trial, the editors emphasize the importance of their work and reveal
the slight common law predominance of the project. In 2003 this
project brought experts from accusatorial and inquisitorial jurisdic-
tions together for a workshop addressing the theme ‘‘Truth and Due
Process in Criminal Trial.’’ The topic of the relationship between truth
and due process is a basic one, even from a continental law point of
view. Yet, in civil law jurisdictions, substantive law is regarded as
important for an institutional framework of criminal justice.
The ﬁrst printed outcome of this overall 3-year project covers
many diﬀerent aspects of criminal trials, including changing con-
ceptions in national trials with regard to the law of evidence (namely
in Scottish criminal trials, presented by Peter Duﬀ), diﬀerences
between the adversarial and inquisitorial models of criminal trial
(‘‘Ritual, Fairness and Truth’’ by Jenny McEwan), specialities of the
jury trial (‘‘Truth and Jury Nulliﬁcation’’ by Matt Matravers), as well
as the conceptual and factual interdependence of ‘‘The Criminal Trial
and the Legitimation of Punishment’’ (Markus D. Dubber), and
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details of certain forms of evidence, namely ‘‘Testimony’’ (by
Duncan Pritchard). A rather functional approach on the working of a
criminal trial is taken in the second half of the book. This half in-
cludes chapters such as ‘‘Managing Uncertainty and Finality: The
Function of the Criminal Trial in Legal Inquiry’’ (by John D. Jack-
son), ‘‘Nothing but the Truth? Some Facts, Impressions and Con-
fessions about Truth in Criminal Procedure’’ (by Heike Jung), ‘‘The
Distinctiveness of Trial Narrative’’ (by Robert P. Burns), and ‘‘The
Objections that Cannot be Heard: Communication and Legitimacy in
the Courtroom’’ (by Emilios Christodoulidis).
This review can – unfortunately – analyze only some of the papers
presented in the 200 pages of this very interesting collection. It will
focus on twodiscussions of ‘‘truth’’ in the frameworkof a criminal trial.
Is the adversarial trial the embodiment of procedural justice as
legal traditionalists in the United Kingdom claim? Or do inquisi-
torial models carry preferable features, which are better suited to
discover truth? Surely enough, the adversarial and inquisitorial
models of criminal trial converge. This is the ﬁrst ﬁnding of Jenny
McEwans paper on ‘‘Ritual, Fairness and Truth.’’ She clearly ex-
plains that discovery of truth is only one objective of a criminal
trial, which itself is constrained by other rationales such as auton-
omy, dignity and respect – aiming at a ‘‘fair trial.’’ Both models, the
adversarial as well as the inquisitorial, strive for these goals in
diﬀerent but converging ways. McEwan shows that the Anglo-
Saxon tradition gives the defendant traditionally more control over
the trial, whereas the civil law tradition perceives him or her rather
as an object in the authoritarian search for truth. McEwan also
paints the other side of the coin: the aggressive, often humiliating
features of cross-examination of witnesses in an adversarial trial.
Such a treatment appears unacceptable for continental lawyers and
will surely be a source of friction in a European area of justice
where in the future evidence shall be collected according to the law
of the requesting state (forum regit actum). To illustrate potential
diﬃculties, one can hardly picture a German judge allowing cross-
examination of a rape victim according to English rules in his court
room. Focusing on national trials, McEwan points out that all legal
systems operate on an evolutionary process of continuous reform,
sometimes adapting better to challenges, sometimes doing worse.
McEwan rightly elaborates the idea of an ideal criminal trial as one
where both society at large and, equally as important, the defen-
dant, perceive the trial as fair.
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‘‘Nothing but the truth?’’ asks Heike Jung, while analyzing ‘‘Some
Facts, Impressions and Confessions about Truth in Criminal Proce-
dure.’’ Discovering the truth, whatever that may be, is still regarded
not only as an ideal, but as an essential element of criminal trials which
are, in many ways, undiluted by the knowledge that truth is only an
illusion. Jung points out that the process of discovery in a criminal
trial does not only address the legal issue of rehabilitation (at the very
end of a criminal trial), but also settles a social conﬂict. LikeMcEwan,
he shows that the striving for material truth is always constrained by
respect for its human participants. Jung wants this respect not to be
perceived as inherent restrictions of a criminal trial, but instead as
based on normative presuppositions of autonomy, dignity and
respect. Jung explains how ‘‘it would not be compatible with the
peace-keeping function of the criminal process for the procedure to
end with the destruction of those who are involved in the evidentiary
process’’. Nevertheless, Jung appropriately concludes that for all
jurisdictions, a system would not be acceptable which starts out from
the assumption that striving for the ‘‘real’’’ truth is immaterial.
These two variations on truth are one valuable contribution to the
development of a normative theory of the criminal trial. In this way,
the authors have fulﬁlled one of the project’s primary objectives. In
their introduction, the editors set out to sketch a ﬁrst glimpse of such
a theory when – among others – pondering the questions: ‘‘What is
truth?’’ and ‘‘Does Truth matter?’’ – and more precisely: Should a
‘‘guilty’’ verdict be read simply as asserting that the defendant is
guilty, or rather as asserting that he has been proved guilty by an
appropriate (or ‘‘due’’) process? The basic dilemma of which is best
suited to answer these questions, an inquisitorial or adversarial
process, must remain unsolved for now. The project resolves
normative issues surrounding the relationship between the verdict
and the process that leads to it: ‘‘Which trial, whose truth?’’
While the idea of developing a normative theory of the criminal
trial is not new, the project’s bringing together of lawyers and phi-
losophers from adversarial and inquisitorial jurisdictions is an espe-
cially promising start to ground a normative theory of the criminal
trial on interdisciplinary work. Thus, we may look very much
forward to the second volume.
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